Judicial Federalism in the ECJ\u27s Berlusconi Case: Toward More Credible Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting Recent Development by Gelter, Martin & Siems, Mathias M.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2005
Judicial Federalism in the ECJ's Berlusconi Case:
Toward More Credible Corporate Governance and
Financial Reporting Recent Development
Martin Gelter
Fordham University School of Law, mgelter@law.fordham.edu
Mathias M. Siems
Durham University
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the European Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martin Gelter and Mathias M. Siems, Judicial Federalism in the ECJ's Berlusconi Case: Toward More Credible Corporate Governance and
Financial Reporting Recent Development, 46 Harv. Int'l L.J. 487 (2005)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/320
VOLUME 46, NUMBER 2, SUMMER 2005
Recent Developments
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM IN THE ECJ'S BERLUSCONI CASE: TOWARD
MORE CREDIBLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL
REPORTING?
INTRODUCTION: CURRENT TRENDS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
FINANCIAL REPORTING IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION
In recent years, the general public in many countries has become increas-
ingly aware of issues concerning business accounting and financial reporting.
Americans hardly need to be reminded of the Enron debacle, where mem-
bers of the company's senior management engaged in fraudulent off-balance
sheet transactions to disguise the true state of the company's financial condi-
tion, a scheme that auditors failed to uncover until the company's implo-
sion.' This and other major corporate governance cases involving questionable
or fraudulent accounting practices led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.2 This
law was an unprecedented Congressional intervention into corporate govern-
ance, an arena that had previously been left largely to Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") rules and professional self-regulation (e.g., auditor
independence requirements), 3 or to state corporate law (e.g., requirements for
board committees and their composition). 4
Accounting scandals are not, however, a phenomenon limited to the United
States. As a result of similar events in some European states, accounting reform
has recently appeared on their policy agendas as well. 5 Italy is notable in this
regard, due in large part to its home-grown Parmalat scandal-until now
1. For more on the Enron case see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gate-
keepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAw. 1403 (2002); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and
the New Information Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1125 (2003); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What
Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, The Fall of Enron, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Spring 2003, at 3; Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J. L. Bus. &
FIN. 9 (2002).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.A.).
3. Cf. William R. McLucas & Paul R. Eckert, The Securities and Exchange Commission's Revised Auditor
Independence Rules, 56 Bus. LAw. 877, 884 (2001) (noting a departure from the private standard-setting
model with respect to auditor independence).
4. Audit committees are not an issue of Delaware corporate law, but special committees approving in-
terested-party transactions are. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 669 A.2d 79 (Del.
1995); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
5. For an overview, see Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-
Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911 (2003).
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Europe's most expensive financial scandal. At the end of 2003, a 14.8 bil-
lion gap that had been disguised by the establishment of an offshore subsidi-
ary was discovered in the firm's accounts. 6 Surprisingly-at least at first
glance-at a time when other countries were strengthening their stance to-
ward accounting fraud, Italy eased the grip of its criminal law on accounting
fraud in a 2002 legislative decree amending the Italian Civil Code. 7 The
Italian courts have submitted this amendment to the scrutiny of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice ("ECJ") for a preliminary ruling.
The objective of this note is to analyze the importance of three joint cases 8-
one of them against the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi-where the
amendment of Italian law is now at issue, and to situate them within the big-
ger picture of the current state of corporate governance and financial report-
ing. Part I explains the legal context of these cases and outlines the opinion
submitted by the Advocate General Juliane Kokott.9 Part II analyzes the
three most important parts of the Advocate General's opinion in detail: the
application of E.U. law on the nondisclosure of accounts to the publication of
false accounts, the need for effective enforcement, and the effect of the prin-
ciple nulla poena sine lege-that there must be neither crime nor punishment
without law. The Advocate General recommends that Italy's judges should
ignore the new Italian law, which takes a lax view of accounting fraud. On
the one hand, this is surprising, as E.U. directives on corporate law and ac-
counting do not address the issue at all. On the other hand, this strict ap-
proach to financial reporting is in line with increasing efforts toward stronger
involvement of the E.U. "federal" level in corporate governance in general,
in consideration of recent U.S. corporate governance developments as well as
the economic underpinnings of accurate accounting. Part III then addresses
the issue of how the Berlusconi case may contribute to an increased effective-
ness of E.U. efforts to strengthen and harmonize corporate law.
6. For the most recent developments, see Parmalat Press Releases, at http://www.parmalat.com/en/
fset.html?sez=eg (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Joined Cases C-387/02, C-391/02, & C-403/02, Berlus-
coni (Oct. 14, 2004), at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (not yet translated into Eng-
lish) (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Opinion Advocate General].
9. According to the CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY, art. 222(2), Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 123 [hereinafter EC TREATY], it is "the duty
of the Advocate General, acting with complete impartiality and independence, to make, in open court,
reasoned submissions on cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court of Justice, require his
involvement." In about eighty percent of all cases, the ECJ follows the Advocate General's opinion. See,
e.g., Paul Meller, Monti Hits Snag in Merger Spat. Attempt Fails to Alter Tetra-Sidel Ruling, INT'L. HERALD
TRIB., May 26, 2004, at Finance 2, 2004 WLNR 5205532.
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I. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OPINION
A. Legal Context
According to prior Italian law, any person who committed accounting fraud
was to be imprisoned for one to five years, and was to be fined two to twenty
million lire.' 0 This provision was amended in 2002 by a legislative decree."
First, the penalty for cases in which no potential harm to shareholders or credi-
tors is shown was reduced to imprisonment for not more than one year and
six months.' 2 If the fraud was capable of causing harm to the company's
shareholders or creditors, the perpetrator is to be imprisoned for six months
to three years for non-listed companies, and one to four years for listed compa-
nies. 13 Second, shareholders or creditors of non-listed companies who wish
for infractions to be tried under these stricter provisions must lodge a crimi-
nal complaint.' 4 Third, because of the reduced penalty, the criminal provision
where no potential harm to shareholders or creditors is shown is now a mis-
demeanor (contravvenzione) rather than a felony (delitto).' 5 This has various
consequences, such as reducing the statute of limitations from ten to three
years. Finally, margins of tolerance have been introduced.' 6 If a violation in-
volves incorrect estimates below certain thresholds, criminal prosecution is
not available.
These changes toward a more lenient criminal law for accounting fraud
were based on the assertion that financial standards had been too onerous for
non-listed companies. Instead of a "one-size-fits-all provision," a multi-tiered
approach was claimed to be more appropriate. Yet the description of the new
law would be incomplete if the personal background of the Italian Prime Minis-
ter Silvio Berlusconi were not taken into account. When Berlusconi was elected
in 2001, a criminal trial was pending at the Tribunale di Milano, where he
was personally charged with false accounting for his non-listed holding com-
pany Fininvest. Since the new rules are supposed to apply retroactively, the
consequence of the 2002 amendment would be dismissal of the charges against
Berlusconi. With respect to the Berlusconi case as well as two other cases,
Italian courts have asked the ECJ to decide whether Italy's mitigation of
accounting law is compatible with E.U. law.
The European law on this issue is based on the First, Fourth, and Seventh
Corporate Law Directives. According to the First Directive, "Member States
10. CODICE CIVILE [C.c.) art. 2621 (2000) (Italy) (repealed 2002). Two to twenty million lire is
equivalent to 1,033 to 10,329.
11. Decreto Legislativo No. 61, Apr. 11, 2002, Gazz. Uff. No. 88, Apr. 15, 2002, at http://gazzette.
comune.jesi.an.it/2002/88/l.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005), amending art. 11 of Law No. 366, Oct. 3,
2001, Gazz. Uff. No. 234, Oct. 8, 2001, at http://gazzette.comune.jesi.an.it/2001/234/1 .htm (last vis-
ited Apr. 20, 2005).
12. C.c. art. 2621 (2002) (Italy).
13. Id. art. 2622.
14. Id.
15. Id. art. 2621.
16. Id. arts. 2621, 2622.
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shall provide for appropriate penalties in case of ... failure to disclose the
balance sheet and profit and loss account." 17 The Fourth Directive requires
that "annual accounts shall give a true and fair view of the company's assets,
liabilities, financial position and profit or loss," and that the "annual ac-
counts ... shall be published as laid down by the laws of each Member State
in accordance with Article 3 of' the First Directive. 18 In contrast to U.S. law, all
companies must therefore disclose their accounts, regardless of whether they
are listed or not.1 9 Finally, the Seventh Directive on consolidated accounts
mirrors the provisions regarding the "true and fair view" requirement and
appropriate sanctions of the First and Fourth Directives.20
B. Overview of the Advocate General's Opinion
The Advocate General Kokott opines that the amendment of Italian law
is incompatible with the aforementioned European Corporate Law Directives. 21
She argues that publication of false accounts ought to be treated under E.U.
law as a failure to publish accounts at all. Thus, according to the Advocate
General, Member States must provide appropriate sanctions for the publica-
tion of false accounts. Although states have some discretion, penalties must
be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. This is not the case with respect
to the more lenient new Italian law. Neither the margins of tolerance, nor
the limitation rules, nor the condition that shareholders or creditors lodge a
criminal complaint satisfy the requirements of E.U. law. Hence, the prior
Italian law is still applicable. The principle that penalties must be lawful
(nulla poena sine lege) does not exclude this result, because at the time of their
conduct the defendants could not have had any expectation that their acts
were not punishable.
17. First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on Coordination of Safeguards, art. 6, 1968
O.J. SPEC. ED. 41.
18. Fourth Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on
the Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, arts. 2(3), 47(1), 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11.
19. For a comparative overview, see Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Creditor Protection, in THE ANAT-
OMY OF CORPORATE LAw 71, 79-83 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). It should be noted that there
are a number of exceptions for small- and medium-sized companies in the E.U. Directives, which consid-
erably reduce the extent of disclosures they need to make. Most strikingly, Member States may waive the
duty to have an audit conducted and to disclose a profit and loss account for the smallest companies.
However, an abridged balance sheet must always be disclosed under the Fourth Council Directive, supra
note 18, arts. 11, 12, 27, 44, 45(2), 47(2), 47(3), 51(2), and the Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC,
art. 6, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1.
20. Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 Based on the Article 54(3)(g) of the
Treaty on Consolidated Accounts, arts. 16(3), 38(6), 1983 O.J. (L 193) 1.
21. See Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8.
2005 / Recent Developments
II. ANALYSIS OF THE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S OPINION
A. Does False Accounting Equal Nondisclosure of Accounts?
In the United States, the criminal provisions of securities law cover per-
sons who do not make required disclosures or who make false or misleading
statements.22 In contrast, the First and Seventh European Directives only state
that in cases of "failure to disclose," appropriate penalties or sanctions must
be provided. As the charges against Berlusconi et al. concerned false ac-
counting, it is therefore doubtful whether European law is relevant to these
Italian cases.
Furthermore, the Italian government, in defending the Italian law, argued
that false accounting was less harmful than nondisclosure of accounts, be-
cause in the former case everybody could scrutinize the existing (but false)
accounts, whereas in the latter case there would be no information at all. 23 This
line of argument is, however, rather specious. It disregards the fact that in
the case of deliberate false accounting there is an element of fraud, and there-
fore, for instance, investors and creditors may see no reason to question the
correctness of the accounts. Nondisclosure could even be seen as less harm-
ful, because the market can theoretically identify and discount this lack of
disclosure.24 Parties dealing with the company or purchasing shares will know
that no credible accounts have been publicized, which is why they are likely
to request them directly from the company or demand a risk premium. In con-
trast, fraudulently distorted financial statements may create the impression
of providing reliable and truthful information and will thus induce third
parties to deal with the company or buy the issuer's shares. The argument
made by defendants that users of financial statements could reexamine the
company's accounts is unlikely to work in practice. Even if they had access to
adequate information for doing so, they should not be required to reexamine
financial information for mandatory accounting (and auditing) to have any
benefit.
The Advocate General Kokott suggests that, according to the E.U. Direc-
tives, the publication of false accounts is equivalent to a failure to publish
accounts at all. 25 According to her opinion, the wording does not exclude
this interpretation, because "failure to disclose" could also be understood as
failure to disclose the truth; the First, Fourth, and Seventh Directives have
to be seen as a whole. The cross-references in these Directives make it clear
that Member States are expected not only to ensure that accounts are pub-
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 24, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 77x (2000)); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 § 32, (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. 788f(a) (West Supp. 2004)); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 § 807(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 18 U.S.C.A. 1348 (West Supp. 2004).
23. Cf Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 75.
24. This relates to the discussion of whether mandatory disclosure is necessary at all. For a concise
overview, see, e.g., Gerard Hertig et al., Issuers and Investor Protection, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAw, supra note 19, at 193, 204-07.
25. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 67-81.
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lished, but also to provide a complete system of sanctions to ensure the pub-
lication of accurate accounts. This is also supported by the purpose of the
Directives, because investors and creditors are not adequately protected if
they cannot rely on the correctness of published accounts.2 6
However, the Advocate General's expansive interpretation of the Directives is
not entirely convincing. The language and development of the Directives
suggest that European law only requires sanctions for nondisclosure. As the
First Directive was not designed to harmonize substantive accounting law,
the wording of Article 6 ("failure to disclose") must be taken seriously. It
cannot be read as "failure to disclose the truth" because the correctness of
accounts cannot be ascertained without looking at national law. The Fourth
and Seventh Directives on substantive accounting issues do not fill this gap
either, because they leave many options for the Member States. It is therefore
not possible, solely under European law, to determine whether false account-
ing has taken place. Finally, the Advocate General's attempt to equate the
publication of false accounts with the failure to publish accounts at all by
reference to the purpose of accounting is not compelling. Different sanctions
for each situation may be reasonable. False disclosure is not the same as non-
disclosure, because (1) the former concerns an act while the latter concerns
an omission, (2) margins of tolerance are conceivable in the former case while
in the latter case violations are easier to ascertain, and therefore (3) public regis-
ters will usually be sufficiently equipped to sanction violations in the latter
case, while, with respect to substantive misstatements, private institutions,
such as auditors and independent directors, will be necessary for enforcement.
Nonetheless, we agree with the outcome reached by the Advocate Gen-
eral, but argue that it should be based on the principle of effective remedies
(effet utile) rather than an analogy of nondisclosure to false accounting. 27 The
Advocate General has correctly put forward the additional argument that
even if a provision of E.U. law does not provide a specific sanction, the Member
States must ensure that violations are penalized under conditions that make
the penalty effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. 28 This also applies to
false accounting. Although a comprehensive substantive harmonization has
not yet been achieved by the European Directives, 29 the substantive rules of
the Fourth Directive must be supplemented by appropriate sanctions.
26. From an economic perspective, it must be noted that misstatements in financial statements may
seriously affect stock prices. See, e.g., Mason Gerety & Kenneth Lehn, The Causes and Consequences of Ac-
counting Fraud, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 587 (1997) (finding significant abnormal negative
returns when the SEC announces charges for accounting fraud).
27. This principle is based on EC TREATY, supra note 9, art. 10 ("Member States shall take all appro-
priate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this
Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the
achievement of the Community's tasks.").
28. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 80. See also Case C-68/88, Commission v. Hellenic Re-
public, 1989 E.C.R. 2965, 2984-85; Case C-341/94, Allain, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4631, 4657; Case C-167/01,
Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd. 2003 E.C.R. 1-10155, 62.
29. However, beginning in 2005, all listed companies are required to apply International Financial
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B. Enforcement: Effective, Proportionate, and Dissuasive Penalties
1. Requirement of Dissuasive Penalties and the Deterrence Calculus
The E.U. law requirement of "appropriate penalties" in cases of account
misstatements raises the question of what such penalties should look like. In
line with previous ECJ case law, 30 the Advocate General states that penalties
must be "effective, proportionate, and dissuasive." 31 The Advocate General
considers a sanction to be effective where implementation of the sanction is
neither practically impossible nor unduly hampered. This requirement is
derived from the principle of effet utile.32 A sanction is considered propor-
tionate where it is (1) tailored to achieve its legitimate aims (by virtue of being
effective and dissuasive) and (2) the least burdensome possible sanction that
fulfils the criterion. Furthermore, the sanction must be in proportion to the
goal pursued. 33
The most complex of the three criteria is the requirement for the sanction
to be dissuasive. The Advocate General explains that dissuasive penalties must
have a deterrent effect against violations of the aims and rules of Community
law; dissuasiveness is a function of the amount of the sanction and the prob-
ability of its enforcement. 34 Even though the Advocate General does not
elaborate on the interplay of a sanction's severity and enforcement probabil-
ity, the opinion, by virtue of this argument, seems to point to the canonical
law and economics calculus on deterrence through legal sanctions. In its most
simplified version, this calculus posits that the expected cost of conviction
should be set equal to the social cost of the offense, where expected costs to
the perpetrator are the costs of the sanction multiplied by the probability of
detection (and prosecution) of the crime. In such a case, an offender will only
violate the law where his expected benefits exceed his expected costs, mean-
ing that individual rational behavior will result in maximal social welfare. 35
Let us briefly consider how such an analysis would come to bear on the is-
sue of accounting fraud. Conceivably, this calculus could result in different
results for failure to disclose accounts and fraudulent misstatements. The
Reporting Standards (formerly known as International Accounting Standards) in their consolidated
financial statements. See Council Regulation 1606/2002 of July 19, 2002, on the Application of Interna-
tional Accounting Standards, art. 4, 2002 OJ. (L 243) 1.
30. See supra note 28.




35. The theory ultimately goes back to Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,
76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). See also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1233-34 (1985); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 242-50 (5th ed. 1998); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
ECONOMICS 79-90 (3d ed. 2003). Expressed formally, a fine or penalty should be set so that C = p.F,
where C is the social cost resulting from the offense, p is the probability of detection of the perpetrator,
and F is the fine or the monetary equivalent of a nonmonetary sanction such as jail time. The simple
analysis here assumes risk neutrality. Id. at 79-83.
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probability variable will likely approach one hundred percent in cases of failure
to disclose. Reporting requirements for public companies aside, under the
scheme of the E.U. Directives, financial statements must always be submit-
ted to a public register, which is usually required to take action if disclosure
duties are not observed.3 6 By contrast, accounting fraud is often implemented
with enough sophistication that it will frequently pass unnoticed, at least in
the short run, especially when management succeeds in deceiving the audi-
tor.
Furthermore, the benefits from nondisclosure will usually be relatively low. 37
Short-term benefits to directors from misstatements-who might see their
position challenged by shareholders if the company's actual performance came
to light, or who fear reputational losses resulting from impending bank-
ruptcy-will usually be higher. But crucially for the deterrence calculus, social
harm is likely to be significantly greater in cases of false disclosure than in
cases of nondisclosure. Normally, potential users of financial benefits are not
likely to draw any positive conclusions about the financial situation of the
company from a failure to disclose, while in the case of fraudulent misstate-
ments, the outward appearance of a healthy state of affairs creates the poten-
tial for widespread deception and relatively significant social harm.
Thus, the requirement for dissuasive penalties must mean something dif-
ferent for accounting fraud than for failure to disclose financial accounts. If
36. For example, in the United Kingdom, financial statements for private companies must be submit-
ted to the Companies House headed by the registrar of companies within ten months after the balance
sheet date. Companies Act, 1985, c. 6, § 244(1)(a) (U.K.). Failure to disclose may result in the imposi-
tion of penalties on the company ranging from £ 100 to £1,000, depending on the length of the delay. Id.
§ 242A. In addition, directors may be criminally liable. Id. § 242(2). In Austria, disclosure to the court
in charge of the register must usually be made within nine months. § 277(1) HANDELSGESETZBUCH
(2005) (Aus.). The court can impose penalties of up to 3,600, which however, can be done repeatedly
until disclosure has been effected. § 283 HANDELSGESETzBUCH (2005) (Aus.). Similarly, in Germany,
financial statements must be submitted to a court within twelve months. § 325(1) HANDELSGESETZ-
HUCH [HGB] (2003) (ER.G.).. Failure to do so may result in penalties on directors between 2,500 and
25,000. Id. § 335a. German courts may only impose such penalties upon request (by any party). Id.
§ 335. Thus, it is still doubtful whether Germany conforms to E.U. law here. In Italy, failure to submit
financial statements may result in penalties ranging from 206 to 2,065. C.c. art. 2630 (2002) (Italy).
37. To be sure, such benefits appear to exist. For example, in Lutz GmbH, Austrian companies that had
failed to disclose their accounts argued that disclosure would allow competitors or others to make esti-
mates about trade secrets from the accounting data. Case C-182/00, 2002 E.C.R. 1-547. Trading partners
might conceivably estimate profit margins, which would put the disclosing company at a disadvantage in
price negotiations. Parties sought to obtain a preliminary ruling from the ECJ to declare that disclosure
requirements imposed on small- and medium-sized companies contravened basic rights. The case was
dismissed by the ECJ on procedural grounds. If there were no such benefits to at least some (closely held)
companies, they would not have taken such pains to avoid disclosure by seeking a ruling from the ECJ
and the Austrian Constitutional Court. In a recent joint case decided on Sept. 23, 2004, the ECJ ruled
against a similar complaint on the merits. Joined Cases C-435/02 & C-103/03, Axel Springer AG v.
Zeirungsverlag Niederrhein GmbH, at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en (not yet avail-
able in English) (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). Springer, a large German media conglomerate, had asked a
court to impose penalties on a small publisher and a radio station (and their managers) in order to induce
them to disclose their financial statements. The defendants argued that duties to disclose accounts under
E.U. law violated freedom of occupation, freedom of the press, and the equal treatment clause. The ECJ
rejected those arguments.
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the ECJ follows the Advocate General's opinion, E.U. law will therefore have
to require Member States to provide for penalties that are sufficiently severe
to deter accounting fraud in light of differences in detection probabilities
and social harm. Even at present, these factors can help explain why E.U.
Member States usually impose only modest fines for nondisclosure3 8 but se-
vere criminal penalties, including prison sentences, for accounting fraud. 39
2. Enforcement Ex Officio
The ECJ has already addressed the issue of penalties for failure to disclose
accounting documents in two related cases concerning implementation of
the European Corporate Law Directives in the Federal Republic of Germany.
In Verband deutscher Daihatsu-Handler eV v. Daihatsu Deutschland GmbH 40 and
Commission v. Germany,4 1 the issue was Germany's insufficient enforcement
system. The E.U. law requiring disclosure of financial statements from pub-
licly traded firms as well as from all business associations with limited liabil-
ity42 exceeded the previous requirements in many Member States. Thus it is
not surprising that, in some Member States (such as Germany), mandated
disclosure for small- and medium-sized companies has met with considerable
resistance.43 Germany, moreover, failed to implement an E.U. directive44 ex-
tending accounting obligations to partnerships whose general partners were
exclusively limited-liability business associations. 45
The objective of the European Accounting Directives, generally, is "the
protection of members [i.e., shareholders) and third parties."46 Already in
the two cases discussed above, the ECJ has taken this objective seriously when
dealing with a provision of German law under which courts could only im-
pose penalties on companies failing to disclose their accounts upon request of a
member of the company, a creditor, or the works council (a representative
body of employees). 47
With respect to privately held companies, it is likely that no such party
will choose to strain its relationship with the perpetrator company by asking
a court to impose penalties on the firm. Moreover, no party may consider
doing so to be worth the effort, because they may be granted access to financial
38. For examples, see supra note 36.
39. For example, the penalties under the new Italian law are significantly stricter than penalties for
failure to disclose even after the reform. See supra Part LA; supra note 36.
40. Case C-97/96, 1997 E.C.R. 1-6843.
41. Case C-191/95, 1998 E.C.R. 1-5449. This case adds little to Daihatsu, but it is concerned with
the Commission's ongoing attempts to induce the German government to comply with E.U. law.
42. Supra Part IA.
43. See Lutz GmbH and the joint Springer case, supra note 37 (resulting from the struggle against dis-
closure requirements).
44. Council Directive 90/605/EEC of Nov. 8, 1990, 1990 O.J. (L 317) 60.
45. Case C-272/97, Commission v. Germany, 1999 E.C.R. 1-2175 (Germany found in violation of
Community law for not transposing Council Directive 90/605/EEC).
46. See Fourth Council Directive, supra note 18, Preamble.
47. See cases cited supra notes 40-41. § 335 HGB (2003) (F.R.G.).
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data directly. However, in Daihatsu, where the German subsidiary of a Japa-
nese carmaker had failed to disclose, the association of German car dealers
trading in that brand was not able to induce the company, on which the mem-
bers of the association were obviously strongly dependent, to disclose its
financial statements to them. 48 The fact that the association had to ask courts to
intervene bolsters both the theory that companies are likely to underproduce
information and the case for mandatory disclosure. 49 In the preliminary rul-
ing in the Daihatsu case, the ECJ pointed to the language in the preamble to
the First Directive and concluded that "disclosure of annual accounts is pri-
marily designed to provide information for third parties who do not know or
cannot obtain sufficient knowledge of the company's accounting and financial
situation," enabling all interested parties to inform themselves on these mat-
ters. 50 Thus, Member States may not restrict the imposition of such penal-
ties to cases involving a request by parties such as creditors or members of
the company concerned, as Germany had done in its previous legislation on
penalties for failure to disclose. 51
The new Italian provision on fraudulent accounting is ambiguous with re-
spect to this aspect of the enforcement mechanism. The provision imposing
stricter penalties where perpetrators intended to deceive shareholders or credi-
tors in order to enrich themselves requires a request by a harmed shareholder
or creditor for criminal prosecution. 52 While the ECJ's language in Daihatsu
was relatively cautious, referring only to the particular enforcement system
(for failure to disclose) in place in Germany at that time, the Advocate Gen-
eral in Berlusconi sweepingly concludes that penalties requiring a request
from a third party do not provide for adequate enforcement per se, as disclo-
sure requirements are designed to protect all third parties. 53 Given that the
list of parties entitled to make such a request is even more restrictive than it
was in the German statute underlying the Daihatsu case, application of the
previous ECJ case law to the Italian provision is elementary once the conclu-
sion that E.U. law requires adequate penalties for accounting fraud has been
drawn. According to the Advocate General, it follows that, should the Ital-
ian courts conclude that the general provision imposing weaker penalties54
did not create sufficient deterrence, the provision imposing stronger penal-
48. In Springer, supra note 37, it was apparently a competitor who requested access to financial state-
ments that had not been disclosed, in violation of the German law as amended after Daihatsu.
49. See, e.g., Hertig et al., supra note 24, at 204-07 (summarizing the reasons for mandatory disclosure
for public companies); contra FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUC-
TURE OF CORPORATE LAW 286-314 (1991). The issue of mandatory disclosure for privately held compa-
nies (as required by E.U. directives) appears not yet to have drawn much attention in law and economics.
50. Case C-97/96, Daihatsu, 1997 E.C.R. at 6865.
51. Id.
52. C.C. art. 2622 (2002) (Italy).
53. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 115.
54. C.c. art. 2621 (2002) (Italy).
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ties but requiring a criminal complaint by a harmed party55 cannot make up
for this deficiency under E.U. law.56
The dangers of releasing false information to the public lie not only in in-
dividual harm, but also in a loss of confidence in financial reporting, which
could result in increased caution by all potential investors, creditors, or trad-
ing partners relying on the financial statements of a company. While dis-
couraging investment may be the consequence in public corporations, users
of financial statements may refrain more generally from dealing with or de-
mand higher risk premiums from those firms that cannot credibly ascertain
that their own balance sheets are accurate. Enhanced accuracy of financial
information is therefore likely to benefit markets on the whole, including pro-
viders of financial statements. Thus, the Advocate General's view that mak-
ing criminal prosecution dependent on requests from individually harmed
persons cannot create sufficient deterrence to maintain the benefits of finan-
cial disclosure is highly persuasive.
3. Zero Tolerance Policy in Accounting?
The amendment to Italian law introduced margins of tolerance under which
false accounting statements could not result in criminal penalties where in-
accuracies or omissions do not materially alter the representation of the eco-
nomic and financial situation of the company.57 The new law assumes that
this is never the case when profits before taxes are not affected by more than
five percent or net assets are not affected by more than one percent. Further-
more, criminal penalties are precluded where false statements or omissions
are the consequence of estimates that, when viewed individually, do not deviate
by more than ten percent from the correct valuation. 58
The Advocate General takes a critical view of these provisions. Starting from
the requirement of the Fourth Directive under which financial statements
should show "a true and fair view of the company's assets, liabilities, financial
position and profit or loss," 59 the opinion concludes that sanctions are neces-
sary where misstatements will potentially betray the reader's belief in the
accuracy of the accounts, but not necessarily where they will not. Thus, a limi-
tation of criminal penalties to cases where misstatements are material is not
precluded per se. However, a misstatement of five percent may mean some-
thing different in each particular company, which is why the law needs to
allow assessments depending on the circumstances of the particular case.
Furthermore, specific margins of error such as the ones set out in the Italian
statutes may foster the habit of misstatements just below the permissible
threshold, which could undermine the reliability of financial statements in
55. Id. art. 2622.
56. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 117.
57. C.c. arts. 2621, 2622 (2002) (Italy). The margins of tolerance are identical in both articles.
58. Id.
59. Fourth Council Directive, supra note 18, art. 2(3).
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general. Deliberate misstatements with the intention to deceive or to enrich
oneself are particularly problematic for maintaining confidence in public
markets, which suggests that there should be no tolerance thresholds for such
misstatements.60
In practice, certain margins of tolerance are inherent to the process of ac-
counting. Even where accounting standards mandate specific treatment of a
business transaction, the necessity of estimates brings a degree of subjectiv-
ity into financial statements. Directors are naturally biased in their judg-
ment, which is why they are more likely to use their discretion to shed a
favorable light on the financial situation.6 1 Even though discretion cannot be
unlimited, the line between justifiable (even if not entirely accurate) ac-
counting treatments and bold misstatements is not always clear. The degree
of certainty achieved by an audit will, for example, be affected by the size of
samples taken by the auditor. Furthermore, even auditors are not expected to
induce firms to make financial statements perfectly accurate, but only to ensure
that no "material" misstatements remain. Information is commonly consid-
ered material when it would have an impact on a decision by a user of financial
statements. 62 The actual thresholds of tolerance are not always clear, and
may vary across countries and client types.63 Materiality is frequently meas-
ured in terms of the percentage effects on net income, total revenues, and
total assets, where an effect of below five percent is usually considered im-
material and an effect of more than ten percent material, with a grey zone in
between. 6
Materiality concerns also affect the assessment of accounting judgments
made by corporate directors and officers during the process of drawing up
financial statements. As stated above, the Advocate General argues that na-
tional legislation that does not implement penalties where the effects of mis-
statements are immaterial is not inherently problematic. However, bright-
line rules that do not allow the courts to consider the circumstances of the
60. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 96-100.
61. Cf Mahzarin R. Banaji er al., How (Un)ethical Are You? HARv. Bus. REV., Dec. 2003, at 56 (de-
scribing how business executives underestimate their own biases); Max H. Bazerman et al., The Impossibil-
ity of Auditor Independence, SLOAN MGMT. REV., Summer 1997, at 89 (describing how self-serving bias
enters accounting judgment); Paul E. Fischer & Robert E. Verrecchia, Reporting Bias, 75 AccT. REV. 229
(2000) (modeling the consequences of biased accounting judgments on managers' wealth).
62. This approach is taken, for example, by the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board in its
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Informa-
tion 7 (May 1980), at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con2.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). See, e.g., Donald F.
Arnold, Sr., et al., The Association Between European Materiality Estimates and Client Integrity, National Cul-
ture, and Litigation, 36 INT'L. J. ACCT. 459, 466-67 (2001); Eugene G. Chewning, Jr., & Julia L. Higgs,
What Does "Materiality" Really Mean?, J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN., May/June 2002, at 61, 63 (both referring
to professional pronouncements discussing materiality). But r. SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-
_02(o) (2004) (defining "material" as limiting "the information required to those matters about which an
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed").
63. Arnold, Sr., et al., supra note 62, at 467-72 (estimating materiality in various countries by em-
pirical study).
64. See, e.g., Seong-Yeon Cho et al., Measuring Stockholder Materiality, 17 ACCT. HORMzONS, 63, 64
(Supp. 2003).
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particular case violate Community law. 65 On this measure, the outcome is in
line with the requirements of accounting practice. However, a zero tolerance
policy is required when a misstatement is the result of an intention to deceive
users of accounting documents or to enrich oneself. A similar policy toward
materiality is taken in the United States. As the Advocate General herself
points out, 66 the SEC is very skeptical about quantitative rules of thumb
such as these, as it lists a number of qualitative circumstances under which
even a quantitatively small effect can be material. For example, significant
effects may result from misstatements covering up a change in earning trends or
affecting a firm's compliance with regulatory requirements. 67
C. Nulla Poena Sine Legefor Berlusconi?
The principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege mean that
there must be neither crime nor punishment without law. They follow directly
from the rule of law principle,68 and are part of most national legal systems,69 as
well as of E.U. law70 and international treaties.71 Additionally, according to
some laws, if prior to a final judgment there is a change in the relevant law
that is more favorable to the accused, this more recent and more lenient law
must be applied. This exceptional retroactivity of criminal law is part of
Italian law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("Rome
Statute"), among many others.72
With respect to the Berlusconi case, the Advocate General Kokott contends
that neither of these principles was infringed. The acts alleged against the
defendants were criminal offenses under national law at the time they were
committed. At that time, the defendants could not have had any expectation
that their conduct would later become unpunishable. The principle of the
retroactive application of a more lenient law did not change this outcome
either, because it would only have been justified if this law had been com-
patible with E.U. law.73
65. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 105.
66. Id. 101.
67. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 19, 1999) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 211), available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
68. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 213-14 (1979).
69. In the United States this principle can only indirectly be inferred from U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See
also STANISLAW POMORSKI, AMERICAN COMMON LAW AND THE PRINCIPLE NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE
25 (Elbieta Chodakowska trans., 2d. ed. 1975); Heyward D. Armstrong, Comment, Rogers v. Tennes-
see: An Assault on Legality and Due Process, 81 N.C. L. REV. 317, 321-25 (2002).
70. See Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 141. See also TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITU-
TION FOR EUROPE art. 11-109(1), Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, 52 [hereinafter EUROPEAN CON-
STITUTION].
71. See, e.g., Council of Europe, EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS art. 7, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; ROME STATUTE OF THE IN-
TERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT arts. 22, 23, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999
(1998) (hereinafter ROME STATUTE].
72. See CODICE PENALE art. 2(3) (2002) (Italy); ROME STATUTE art. 24(2).
73. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8, 139-168.
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In order to understand the Advocate General's reasoning, we must decide
whether the amended Italian law or the former Italian law is applicable. First,
application of the amended Italian law could be based on a European princi-
ple of retroactive application of the more lenient law. It is, however, not yet
clear whether this principle is part of E.U. law. 74 Furthermore, the rationale
for such a European principle would only be that the same rules required by
European law for future crimes should also apply for crimes committed in
the past. Hence, this rationale cannot be brought forward in the Berlusconi
case, because Italy is required to restrengthen its criminal law on accounting
fraud to respond to future crimes. The second problem is that, according to
Italian law, the new law should also apply to old cases. This follows directly
from the new Italian law, but could perhaps also be based on the Italian
principle of the retroactive application of a more lenient law. 75 It is therefore
decisive whether the principle nulla poena sine lege requires the European Un-
ion to accept this rule of Italian law. This could be the case, because, in gen-
eral, European citizens can rely on their national laws and need not worry
whether such law is a proper implementation of a European directive. How-
ever, in the present situation, defendants present no reliance interest worth
protecting. As the alleged crimes were committed before the amendment of
the Italian law, there is no reason for European law to be put aside. Conse-
quently, the older and stricter Italian law should apply.
III. IMPLICATIONS: TOWARD A STRONGER EUROPEAN INFLUENCE ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE LAW
A. "Weak" Supranational European Corporate Law?
Beyond the individual policies and interpretations at stake, the Berlusconi
case can be seen as a remarkable move in the ongoing development of Euro-
pean corporate law, particularly in view of recent ECJ case law on the sub-
ject. The most important recent shift has come from a series of cases that
have started to define Europe as a diversified market for corporate law, akin
to the multitude of laws and standards in the United States.76 In the future,
74. See id. 154-168. This principle is stated explicitly in the EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION art. II-
109(1).
75. In contrast, the Opinion Advocate General discusses the Italian law as an alternative to a Euro-
pean rule on this issue. Opinion Advocate General, supra note 8 166-167.
76. See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459 (holding
that Danish authorities may not deny the registration of a branch office of a British Private Limited
Company that had obviously been set up to do business in Denmark only); Case C-208/00, U0berseering
BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement (Nov. 5, 2002), at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=en (holding that German courts may not deny the legal personhood of a Dutch com-
pany that had set up its main office in Germany) (last visited Apr. 20, 2005); Case C-167/01, Inspire Art,
2003 E.C.R. 1-10155 (finding that a Dutch law subjecting formally foreign companies to additional
capital requirements was contradictory to E.U. law); Case C-9/02, de Lasteyrie du Saillant v. Ministre de
l'tconomie, des Finances et de l'Industrie (Mar. 11, 2004), at http://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.
pl?lang=en (finding taxation on unrealized gains of a natural person moving from France to Belgium in
violation of E.U. law, which is expected to apply also to companies moving from one state to another)
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actors on the corporate law stage will likely be able to choose their preferred
national corporate law, irrespective of where the corporation is headquartered or
does most of its business, whereas it will become harder for Member States
to pursue their particular policies in view of regulatory competition."7
For the future development of European corporate law, the influence of
the European "federal" level may be crucial. In some ways, the European Union
can be compared to U.S. federal authorities as an actor in corporate govern-
ance issues. In a recent article, Professor Mark Roe persuasively argues that
in the United States, Congress, the federal courts, and the SEC have a pow-
erful influence on the development of state corporate law. This influence pre-
cludes actors in individual states, including Delaware (the state where most
public companies are incorporated), from pursuing their own policies with-
out inhibition, for federal control may be exercised by means of actual legis-
lation or other direct intervention, as well as by the mere threat of federali-
zation. 78 In view of the recent ECJ case law, Professor Roe points out that
the development of European corporate law on the national level will thus
depend on whether and in what direction the E.U. "federal" level pulls na-
tional laws. 79
As to the present situation, it is safe to say that the influence of European
institutions on corporate governance is weak compared to those in the U.S.
context. ECJ cases on European corporate law have remained relatively rare,
and the European Union still lacks a transnational capital markets enforce-
ment authority such as the SEC, let alone a transnational stock exchange
comparable to the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"), which can influence
corporate governance in listed companies.8 0 There is a considerable amount
of "derived" E.U. corporate law in the form of directives, but these are often
seen as ineffectual.81 Some commentators have argued that European direc-
tives have avoided dealing with issues that are really important for corporate
governance, such as the structure of corporate decisionmaking bodies8 2 or
(last visited Apr. 20, 2005). Furthermore, regulatory competition will be fostered by the forthcoming
cross-border mergers Council Directive. See Mathias M. Siems, The European Directive on Cross-Border
Mergers: An International Model?, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. (forthcoming 2005).
77. For more on the impact of these cases, see Mathias Siems, Convergence, Competition, Centros and
Conflicts of Law: European Company Law in the 21st Century, 27 EUR. L. REv. 47 (2002); Jens C. Dammann,
Freedom of Choice in European Corporate Law, 29 YALE J. INT'L. L. 477 (2004); Tobias H. Troeger, Choice of
Jurisdiction in European Corporate Law: Perspectives of European Corporate Governance, at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstracrtid=568782 (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
78. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARv. L. REV. 588 (2003).
79. Id. at 643-44.
80. However, a wave of mergers among European stock exchanges has occurred during the past few
years. Euronext was created in 2000 when the Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam Exchanges merged. See
http://www.euronext.com. Both Euronext and the Deutsche Bbrse, which runs the Frankfurt Stock Ex-
change, are attempting to take over the London Stock Exchange. Silvia Ascarelli, Euronext Makes LSE
Pitch, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2005, at C18.
81. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
439, 454 (2001) ("[E]fforts at harmonization have generally borne little fruit.").
82. A directive was planned but never implemented because of disagreement between different Mem-
ber States. See Amended Proposal for a Fifth Directive Founded on Article 54 (3)(g) of the EEC Treaty
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fiduciary duties. 83 Where the directives have dealt with vital issues, some
Member States have been able to circumvent them by applying narrow con-
structions that have never been challenged before the ECJ, such as in the.
cases of the directives on mergers and spin-offs, 84 or the Second Directive's
requirements for raising and maintaining capital.85 The accounting require-
ments of the Fourth and Seventh Directives include an exceedingly large
number of elective provisions that allow Member States either to decide the
issue on the basis of their own judgment or to pass the question on to indi-
vidual companies. 86
B. Judicial Activism and Future Legislation:
The Path Toward Increased Supranational Influence?
The Advocate General's opinion discussed in this note might be seen as
one step--complementary to the ECJ's opening up of E.U. corporate law for
regulatory competition-in tightening the boundaries set by E.U. law within
which national actors may operate.
However, it is unclear whether the specific regulatory path proposed by
the Advocate General would prove optimal. The doctrinal argument for the
newly created duty of Member States to deter accounting fraud adequately
should preferably not rest on an analogy to the duty to deter nondisclosure
of financial statements, but on the principle of effet utile alone. 87 This princi-
ple could also enhance the effectiveness of the European Corporate Law Di-
rectives in general. Whereas the ECJ has not often had the opportunity to
restrict Member States' scope of discretion in the interpretation of Commu-
nity corporate law by extensively interpreting directives or restraining even
the most blatant circumventions, effet utile could be taken as a basis to ensure
that the policies embodied in the Corporate Law Directives are taken seri-
ously by Member States' legislators and courts. Conceivably, such an approach
could result in a strengthening of Community-derived corporate law in the
long run. The general principle of effet utile has great potential, as Member
Concerning the Structure of Public Limited Companies and the Powers and Obligations of their Organs,
1983 O.J. (C 240) 2.
83. E.g., Harald Halbhuber, National Doctrinal Structures and European Company Law, 38 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 1385, 1406 (2001).
84. Third Council Directive 78/855/EEC of 9 October 1978, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 36; Sixth Council Di-
rective 82/891/EEC of 17 December 1982, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47. See Halbhuber, supra note 83, at 1407
n. 111 (explaining that equivalent transactions are effected through different means in the United King-
dom, where the provisions of the directives are not taken to apply).
85. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on Coordination of Safeguards, 1977
OJ. (L 26) 1. See Halbhuber, supra note 83, at 1406 n.109 (noting that, whereas German case law has
developed draconian sanctions for circumvention of the rules for contributions in kind, no such sanctions
exist in the United Kingdom, France, or Belgium).
86. The Fourth Directive, for example, includes more than 40 elective provisions left open to the
Member States and 35 options left to individual companies. RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & KLAUS J. HoPT,
LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE, 4 INTEGRATION THROUGH LAw 235 (Mauro
Cappelletti et al. eds., 1988).
87. Supra Part II.B.
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States are required to follow ECJ opinions, and, over time, the requirements
of E.U. law will be specified in more detail by the court in future cases.
One example where the effectiveness of European harmonization is some-
what in doubt is insider trading. Although a directive requiring Member
States to prohibit insider trading was issued in 1989,88 there has been com-
paratively little success in enforcement. 89 However, current E.U. insider trading
law requires sanctions imposed by Member States to be "effective, propor-
tionate, and dissuasive." 90 A strong stance by the ECJ on the effectiveness of
sanctions might, in the years to come, imply that Member States will be
required to strengthen their enforcement systems or even impose more se-
vere penalties.
Such an activist judicial approach is not without problems, as it may gen-
erate further issues that courts will be called upon to resolve. The Berlusconi
case's examination of the meaning of "dissuasive penalties" is illustrative. As
discussed above, 91 it is likely that this term will mean something different-
i.e., greater penalties-in cases of accounting fraud than in cases of mere
failure to disclose.
In any case, the strong stance taken by the Advocate General is in line
with the policy pursued by the E.U. Commission to promote more Commu-
nity involvement by means of legislation in both corporate governance and
financial reporting. With respect to accounting requirements, the strength-
ening of the European level of regulation seems to be coming, in part, from
legislation. Perhaps most importantly, an E.U. regulation adopted in 2002
requires public companies to use International Financial Reporting Stan-
dards ("IFRS") (formerly known as International Accounting Standards ("IAS"))
for their consolidated statements beginning in 2005.92 The large number of
elective provisions in the Accounting Directives (most of which are related
to substantive issues of accounting) effectively allowed Member States to
maintain their accounting traditions, and failed to provide uniform, compa-
rable financial statements. 93 Pressure from capital markets to introduce a
88. Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Deal-
ing, 1998 O.J. (L 334) 30. According to Article 14, this directive had to be implemented by
June 1, 1992. It has now been repealed by Council Directive 2003/6/EC of 28 January 2003 on Insider
Dealing and Market Manipulation, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16.
89. See, e.g., EILfs FERRAN, BUILDING AN EU SECURITIES MARKET 33 (2004) (reporting "only nine-
teen convictions for insider dealing were achieved in Britain, Germany, France, Switzerland and Italy in
the five years before 2002, contrasting sharply with the forty-six successful prosecutions achieved in the
same period by a single district court in Manhattan."); Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World
Price ofInsider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 80-81 (2002) (reporting the total absence of any cases of enforce-
ment in three E.U. Member States).
90. Council Directive 2003/6/EC, supra note 88, art. 14(1).
91. Supra Part II.BI.
92. Council Regulation 1606/2002, supra note 29.
93. E.g., Werner F. Ebke, Accounting, Auditing and Global Capital Markets, in CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL
MARKETS AND THE BUSINESS IN THE LAW: LIBER AMICORUM RICHARD M. BUXBAUM 113, 119 (Theo-
dor Baums et al. eds., 2000). See also Axel Hailer, International Accounting Harmonization. American Hegem-
ony or Mutual Recognition with Benchmarks? Comments and Additional Notes from a German Perspective, 4 EUR.
ACCT. REv. 235, 237 (1995) ("The new accounting rules were interpreted in the light of the existing
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uniform set of accounting standards prompted the Commission to support
the efforts of the International Accounting Standards Committee and then
to implement JAS for the consolidated accounts of European publicly traded
firms.94 Furthermore, the Commission has recently proposed a new auditor
directive that is to include specific provisions on auditor independence, re-
quirements for audit committees, and rules for the auditor appointment and
dismissal processes. 95 Following a report on corporate governance by the High
Level Group of Company Law Experts, 96 it also issued an action plan that,
among other things, aims at strengthening shareholder rights and improv-
ing board composition, foremost with respect to independent directors and
audit committees.97 However, with respect to accounting enforcement and
especially account fraud, the increased credibility may be enhanced by judi-
cial activity. The opinion discussed in this Note and the ECJ ruling that is
expected to follow may become important steps along the way.
This growth of E.U. accounting and corporate law can be seen as a reac-
tion to developments in U.S. law. With the U.S. Congress "federalizing" issues
of corporate governance through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and gener-
ally trying to strengthen the financial reporting environment, for example by
extending auditor independence requirements, 98 it has become a priority for
the Commission and European policymakers to follow suit. For example, there
has been a clear influence of U.S. law on the Commission's recommendation
on auditor independence99 and on a recent German act implementing,
among other things, amendments to auditor independence requirements. 10 0
This is due in part to the many important European companies that are cross-
listed on the NYSE.
German accounting model ....."); Sabine D. Selbach, The Harmonization of Corporate Taxation & Account-
ing Standards in the European Community and their Interrelationship, 18 CONN. J. INT'L. L. 523, 550 (2003)
("These options reflect the different attitudes towards accounting and financial reporting in the Member
States."); Hilda Theunisse, Financial Reporting in EC Countries. Theoretical Versus Practical Harmonization:
Two Case Studies, 3 EUR. ACCT. REv. 143 (1994) (finding significant differences between accounting in
Belgium, France and Germany).
94. Cf. Council Regulation 1606/2002, supra note 29, Preamble, 4-18.
95. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Statutory Audit of
Annual Accounts and Consolidated Accounts and Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC,
COM(2004)177 final (Mar. 16, 2004).
96. Jaap Winter et al., Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on a Modern Regu-
latory Framework for Company Law in Europe, Nov. 4, 2002, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal-
market/enlcompany/company/moden/consult/report_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
97. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Modernising Company
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union-A Plan to Move Forward, at 13, 15,
COM(2003)284 final (May 21, 2003).
98. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit. II, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 78a).
99. Commission Recommendation of 16 May 2002, Statutory Auditors' Independence in the EU: A
Set of Fundamental Principles, COM(2002)1873, 2002 O.J. (L 191) 22; see also Commission Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Statutory Audit of Annual Accounts and Consolidated
Accounts and Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC, COM(2004)177 final (Mar. 16, 2004).
100. Gesetz zur Einfiihrung internationaler Rechnungslegungsstandards und zur Sicherung der
Qualitit der Abschlusspridfung (Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz), v. 9.12.2004 (BGBI I S.3166).
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In the United States, regulating the accounting practices of publicly traded
firms has long been a prerogative of institutions at the federal level, most of
all the SEC, which sets forth requirements for annual financial disclosure in
Regulation S-X. 10 Enforcement of financial accounting standards and pre-
vention of fraud is thus also an issue of SEC activity. With Sarbanes-Oxley,
the U.S. Congress tried to deter fraud by implementing harsher penalties. 10 2
In contrast, in spite of E.U. directives on accounting, so far accounting fraud
in Europe has been left completely to the national legislatures and enforce-
ment bodies. The Advocate General's opinion and the ECJ's expected ruling
represent initial moves toward a federal regime more like the one in the United
States. If the ECJ is serious about the "dissuasive penalties" requirement, at
least some aspects of enforcement must be taken out of the hands of national
actors. If more serious penalties result in increased deterrence of accounting
fraud, this shift is likely to be beneficial.
The highly politicized Berlusconi case shows how national actors can be
subject to conflicts of interest resulting from peculiar political circumstances.
On a more general level, national legislators may sometimes be targets for local
pressure groups in corporate law.'0 3 Even though the European supranational
level is probably an equally good breeding ground for lobbyists, the ECJ's
independent position appears to provide an effective balancing force at least
when lobbyists prevail upon the national level, as in this case. We therefore
agree with the strong policy statement implied in the Advocate General's
opinion. In conjunction with the introduction of International Financial Re-
porting Standards for consolidated accounts of listed companies beginning
in 2005, Europe seems to be on the right track toward a financial accounting
system that will be taken seriously by investors across national borders.
-Martin Gelter*
Mathias M. Siems**
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